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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE :MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF CLARENCE
HENRY McFARLAND,
Deceased.

l

Case No.
10506

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal by the Executrix of the Estate
of Clarence Henry :McFarland, Deceased, from an
Order of the District Court denying the motion of such
Executrix to set aside an Order Confirming Sale of
real property and to dismiss the petition for Confirmation of Sale of such property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
The lower Court overruled the motion of the Exe('utrix, the appellant herein, and ordered that the Order
1

Confirming Sale of real property theretofore entered
should remain in full force and effect (R 21).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
While the appellant has failed and declined to
submit a brief outlining its position or contentions or
relief sought, it is assumed that appellant seeks a
reversal of the Order of the District Court denying
appellant's motion hereinafter referred to.
Respondents ask only that the appeal be dismissed
and the order of the lower Court be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The above-entitled matter is predicated upon an
Order Confirming Sale of an interest in real property
in the above-entitled estate. Sarah Jane McFarland,
the duly qualified and acting Executrix of the estate,
petitioned the Court for confirmation of sale of an
undivided three-fourths interest in and to certain real
property in Salt Lake County, Utah, said undivided
interest being the interest which the estate held therein,
the other undivided interest being held by one, Leslie
W. and Deon B. Davis. An agreement for the sale
of the undivided interest of the decedent, Clarence
Henry McFarland, and of his estate, was entered into
by said Executrix simultaneously with an agreement
on the part of the said Davises to sell their undivided
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interest. The purported purchaser of the estate interest
was one, 'Villiam C. Roderick, who, according to the
Petition of the Executrix for Confirmation of Sale,
had agreed to pay a total of $3,500.00 for the whole
property, three-fourths of which (or $2,625.00) would
become an asset of the estate by virtue of its interest
in the whole property (R 2). The petition of the Executrix further alleged that the amount offered was
in excess of 90% of the value of said real property.
The petition of the said Executrix further set forth
as the basis for the petition that it was to the best advantage and interest of the estate that the same be sold
and the sale confirmed by reason of the location and the
joint ownership.
The Executrix of the estate, who signed the Petition for Confirmation, namely, Sarah Jane McFarland,
was and is likewise the sole beneficiary of the estate
under the vVill of the decedent (R 29).
The Petition for Confirmation of Sale prayed that
a time and place be fixed for the hearing of the petition
and that notice be given to the persons entitled thereto
in the manner required by law and the Order of the
Court. Due and proper notice was given of the hearing
on said petition by both mailing to all interested parties
and by posting notice in three public places (R 27
and 28).
On the date set for hearing the Petition for Confirmation of the Sale, to-wit, on the 21st day of October,
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the Court, the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow sitting,
in open Court, opened the matter to public bid an<l
asked whether or not there were any other, further or
better bids for the property. Thereupon, Gordon C.
Holt and Sterling G. Webber submitted a bid based
upon $4,000.00 for the whole of said property, which
would result in three-fourths thereof, or $3,000.00,
being bid for the interest of the estate in said property,
which said bid was more than 10% higher than the bid
theretofore made and was considered by the Court to
be a better bid than that previously made. The said
Holt and Webber thereupon tendered to the Executrix, through the Court, more than 10% of said bid
and further tendered, through the Court, a written
agreement and offer to purchase said property on the
basis therein set forth ( R 5, 6, and 17). No other or
better bids were made, and the Court thereupon sold
said property to the said Holt and Webber and confirmed the said sale.
The Executrix, through her attorney, or otherwise,
failed to have prepared an Order Confirming Sale, and
the said Holt and Webber thereupon presented to the
Court an Order Confirming Sale, and on the 24th day
of March, 1965, the Court entered its Order Confirming
Sale of said property to Gordon C. Holt and Sterling
G. 'Vebber and ordered the Executrix to issue an
Executrix Deed for said property in customary form
upon tender of the balance of the bid price therefor.
Notwithstanding the tender of such purchase price and
request for said Deed, the Executrix failed and refused
4

to execute and deliver the same to the said Holt and
\Vebber.
On the 6th day of April, 1965, the Executrix filed
a l\lotion for an Order dismissing the Petition for Confirmation of Sale and to declare null and void the Order
Confirming Sale to Gordon C. Holt and Sterling G.
\l\T ebber dated March 24, 1965 (R 7-9).
Objections to said Motion were filed by Holt and
\V ebber ( R 14-17). The Motion was considered finally
by the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow on November
2:.:!, 1965, at which time he overruled the Motion to set
aside the Order Confirming Sale ( R 20) and on said
date issued his Order denying said motion (R 21).
From the Order denying the motion of the Executrix to set aside the Order Confirming Sale, the
Executrix appealed. The Executrix, through her counsel of record, has chosen not to file a brief in the action
and simply stand on the record. Hence, the necessity
for respondents to detail the facts of the action as above
set forth.

ARGUMENT

I
TlIE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISl\IISSED
FOR FAILURE OF APPELLANT TO PERFECT THE APPEAL OR CONFORM TO THR
RULES.

5

The appellant has failed to perfect its appeal by
failure to comply with the rules of this Court requiring
the filing of an appellant's brief within one month after
the record on appeal was filed in the Supreme Court
(Rule 75 (p) ( 1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).
Not only has the appellant failed to so comply, but the
appellant has served notice upon the Court that it does
not intend to comply with that rule. (See appellant's
document filed in this Court on March 21, 1966 entitled
"Notice of Reliance on Record on Appeal and U pou
Certain Statutory Provisions and Cases."
This Court held in the case of LePasiotes vs. Dinsdale, 242 P. 2d, 121 Ut. 359, that where an appellant
failed to specifically designate matters constituting
prejudicial error so that respondents could clearly an<l
fairly meet appellant's contentions, that the Court will
not review such claims of prejudicial error so generally
assigned. See also Lawrence vs. Butterfield, 12 Ut.
2d. 347, 366 P. 2d, 607.
By reason of the failure and refusal of appellant
to comply with the rules of the Court, we urge that
the appeal should be dismissed. (Rule 73 (a) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.)
II
THE ORDER OF THE COURT BELO\V
WAS PROPER AND SH 0 UL D BE AFFIRMED.
6

A. 1lhe Motion of Appellant Was Not 1limely
Made.
The Order of the Court confirming the sale of the
real property in question was made and entered by the
Court on the 24th day of March, 1965 (R 6). Such an
Order became a final judgment as to the matters therein set forth upon the entry thereof, the sale from that
time being valid and binding (75-10-16, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953). If the appellant was to interpose
any motion to set aside the judgment or to alter or
amend the judgment of the Court, such motion was
required to be served not later than ten ( 10) days after
the entry of the judgment. (Rule 59 (b) and 59 ( e),
Rules of Civil Procedure.) The motion of the Executrix to set aside the Order of the Court was not made
nor filed until April 6, 1965, which was twelve days
after the entry of the judgment, and hence, was not
within the time prescribed by the rules of the Court.

B. The Sale was a Public Sale and the Order of
the CoU1·t Confirming the Sale was Valid and Proper.

ln the argument hereinafter set forth, we will
endeavor to cover all phases of the matter which were
presented by verbal argument of the appellant in the
Court below, in view of the fact that appellant has
chosen to file no brief or argument in support of its
contentions in this Court. Likewise, the code sections
mentioned in the document filed in this Court by the
appellant entitled "Notice of Reliance Upon Record
on Appeal" etc., will be referred to herein.

7

The primary contention, and in fact the sole contention, of the appellant in its arguments in the Court
below, was that in spite of the fact that appellantexecutrix had filed its Petition for Confirmation of
Sale setting forth grounds and reasons therefor and
alleging that the amount offered for the property as
sought to be condemned was fair and in excess of 90%
of the value of the property, that nevertheless, inasmuch as the appraisal was not in fact made and on
file, the Court could not properly sell or confirm a sale
of the property in these proceedings.
The appellant then replied and apparently now
relies upon Section 75-10-12, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, which reads as follows:
"75-10-12. Confirmation of private sale. No
sale of real estate at private sale shall be confirmed by the court unless the sum offered is at
least ninety per cent of the appraised value
thereof, nor unless such real estate has been
appraised within one year of the time of such
sale. If it has not been so appraised, or if the
court is satisfied that the appraisment is too high
or too low, appraisers must be appointed, and
they must make an appraisement thereof as in
the case of an original appraisement. This may
be done at any time before the sale or the confirmation thereof."

It should be observed that the Petition for Confirmation of Sale signed and verified by Sarah Jane
McFarland, the Executrix of the Estate of Clarence
Henry McFarland, Deceased, and the appellant herein,
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after setting forth as the primary basis for the sale
that it would be to the advantage, benefit and interest
of the estate because of the fact that it was simply an
undivided interest in property held in common ownership with someone other than the estate, prayed that
notice be given of the hearing in the manner provided
by the law and by the Order of the Court.
Notice was accordingly given to all persons interested and to the public generally through the posting
of notices in three public places, to-wit, the west front
entrance of the County Courthouse, on a public posting
board at 33rd South and State Streets, and in the Post
Office in Murray, all in Salt Lake County, Utah, where
said notices remained posted for ten days. Said notices
set forth the terms of the off er theretofore made on
the property so that the public was informed with
regard thereto and thereby invited to appear and to
bid at the time set for the sale of said property (R 27
and 28).
At the time appointed for the sale as set forth
in the public notices thereof, the Court opened the
matter up for public bid, asking for any other, further
or higher or better bids than the one which had been
made and concerning which the confirmation was sought
(R 5). Such having been done, the sale then became
a "public sale" and not a "private sale" of the property
involved. It is important to note that our probate code
from its very inception has and still does recognize
both public and private sales and the differentiation

9

thereof in connection with property sold or to be sold
in probate proceedings.
Section 75-10-2, U.C.A., to which appellant refers,
simply reads as follows:
"Sale to be reported to and confirmed by
court. All sales must be reported under oath to,
and confirmed by, the Court before the title to
the property sold passes, except as hereinafter
otherwise provided.''
Section 75-10-3 immediately following that section,
however, states:
"Sales-Report and confirmation. The executor or adminstrator may sell any property
of the estate without order of the court, at either
public or private sale and with or without notice
as he may determine, but must make return of
such sales in all cases; and if directions are given
in the will as to the mode of selling, or the particular property to be sold, such direction must
be observed. In any case, no title passes unless
the sale is confirmed by the court."
The provisions of 75-10-2 are duplicated by 7510-3, except for the references in the latter to both
public and private sales. The purpose, of course, of
the reference to this section is again to emphasize that
our probate code expressly recognizes that sales of
property thereunder may be at either public or private
sale, but that the requirements of Section 75-10-12
relate only to private sales.
The law is simple and clear and adopts a common
sense rule as to what is a public sale as opposed to a
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private sale. A public sale is simply a sale in which
the public, upon proper notice, is invited or permitted
to participate. See annotation 4 A.L.R. 2d, 575, and
\iV ords and Phrases, Vol. 35, page 625. Even though
the original offer to purchase the property may have
been initiated on the basis of a private sale, the sale as
conducted clearly was a public sale and the confirmation was of a public sale, after due notice where everyone and anyone desiring to do so had an opportunity
to bid on the property. See in this connection Plimpton
vs. Mattakeunk Cabin Colony, (D.C. Conn.) 9 Fed.
Supp. 288, 306, in which the Court held that where
equity receivers entered into a contract of sale with
the purchaser, subject to confirmation by the Court,
and notice was given to all interested parties and other
bids were invited, and there was opportunity for fair
competitive bidding, and a sale was confirmed at a
public hearing, such sale was a "public sale" and not
a private sale as respects validity, and that the confirmation thereof should not be disturbed.
Referring again to Section 75-10-12 entitled "Confirmation of Private Sale" it commences by defining
the matter to which it relates as follows:
"No sale of real property at private sale shall
be confirmed by the Court unless ... "
Note that it does not say "at public or private
sale" as do other sections of the probate code, nor does
it simply refer to "sale" generally, but is definite and
specific in limiting such to private sales.
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There is, of course, an obvious reason for the provision of Section 75-10-12 in requiring a current appraisal before confirmation of a private sale, because
at a private sale there is opportunity for unscrupulous
executors or administrators to connive with persons
interested in purchasing property at private sale so
as to permit them to obtain said property at less than
its reasonable value, to the detriment of others interested in the estate. When, however, the property is
opened up for public bid in open court after notice, the
prime reason for the current appraisal disappears in
the face of competitive public bidding.
The code sections which vitally affect this matter,
other than those heretofore quoted and which clearly
give the Court authority to make a valid sale and order
confirming the same, are Section 75-10-15 and 75-10-16,
which read as follows:
75-10-15. Vacationand resale for better price.

If the sale was unfair or the sum bid disproportionate to the value, or if it appears that a
sum exceeding such bid by at least ten per cent,
exclusive of the expenses of a new sale, may be
obtained, the court may vacate the sale and direct
another to be had. If an offer greater in amount
than that named in the return is made to the
court in writing by a responsible person, the
court may accept such offer and confirm the sale
to such person, or order a new sale. (Italics
added).
75-10-16. Confirmation of sale. If it appears
to the court that the sale was legally made and
fairly conducted, and that the sum bid is not
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disproportionate to the value of the property
sold, and that a greater sum, as above specified,
cannot be obtained, or if the increased bid mentioned in the next preceding section is accepted
by the court, the court must make an order confirming the sale, and directing conveyances to
be executed. The sale from that time is confirmed
and valid. If after the confirmation the purchaser
neglects or refuses to comply with the terms
of sale, the court may, on motion of the executor
or administrator and after notice to the purchaser, order a resale of the property to be made.
If the amount realized on such resale does not
cover the bid and the expenses of the previous
sale, such purchaser is liable to the estate for
the deficiency.
\Ve observe that Section 75-10-15 relates to all
sales without distinction as to whether they are public
or private. In the matter before the Court, a bid was
made by Holt and Webber exceeding the previous
bid by at least 10%; the Court thereupon had authority
to vacate the attempted sale to Roderick. Furthermore,
at that time and in the public bidding, an offer in a
greater amount than that previously bid was in fact
made to the Court in writing (R 17) by a responsible
person. The Court thereupon under the authority of
the last sentence of Section 75-10-15 accepted such
greater offer and confirmed th sale. (We point out
that the last sentence of 75-10-15 seems to stand alone
in authorizing the Court to act when conditions therein
set forth are met.) The Court thereafter made and
entered its formal order confirming the sale and directiug the conveyance of the property to Holt and Webber
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( R 6) . The sale from that time was confirmed and valid.
(Section 75-10-16).
The trial court in its sound discretion overruled
the objections of the petitioner and appellant herei11
to the confirmation, and its motion to set aside the order
confirming the sale. This court has held in Nielson's
Estate vs. Nielson, 107 Ut. 564, 155 P. 2d. 968, that
where a sale of property is made on a representation
in the petition that it is for the benefit and best interest
of the estate, and the Court having confirmed the sale,
that:
''In reviewing an order confirming a sale or
denying application for confirmation of sale,
such order will not be set aside except upon a
showing of abuse of discretion. There must be
a showing of misapprehension of the facts by
the court or capricious or arbitrary action without due regard to facts and circumstances."
There has been no showing, nor any scintilla of proof
that the Court did abuse its discretion in this matter.

C. 1 he Executrix· is Estopped from Attacking the
Validity of the Sale and Confirmation.
1

The petition for confirmation of sale was made and
signed by Sarah Jane McFarland, who is both the
Executrix of the Estate and likewise the sole beneficiary under the Will of the decedent ( R. 29) . It is
a uniform rule of law that a petitioner may not object
to the confirmation of the sale, but waives the objection
through the petition filed; furthermore, that objections
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do not lie if they could have been raised on the hearing
for confirmation. See Bancroft Probate Practice 2d
'
Edition, Sections 608 and 609. The same volume at
Section 611, page 190, further sets forth the rule that
if the only persons interested have ratified there can
be no proper objections to the confirmation. In 34
C.J.S., Section 615, Executors and Administrators,
the rule is stated thus:
"Neither the representative who made the sale
nor his surety can impeach the validity of the
proceedings instituted and conducted by such
representative."
Again in that same volume, Section 616 at page
593, it is stated:
"One who might otherwise successfully attack
a sale may be estopped from so doing under the
principles governing estoppel generally. Thus,
one will nc;>t be heard to complain of defects for
the existence of which he is himself responsible,
or to object to the regularity of proceedings had
on his own application, or instigation, or which
he has aided in carrying into effect or consented
to."
It should be obvious under the authorities above
set forth that the executrix, being the sole beneficiary
and the only one having an interest in this matter,
having initiated the proceedings and having requested
the Court to confirm the sale, clearly has waived any
objection to the proceedings thereunder or the validity
thereof and is estopped to object to the sale made by
the Court and the order of the Court confirming such
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sale. Parenthetically in this regard, it should be stated
that the full purchase price represented by the offer
of Holt and 'Vebber, which was accepted and confirmed, was long ago paid to the executrix and ha~
never been returned or tendered back.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we respectfully
submit that the appeal should be dismissed and the
order of the lower court affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ZAR E. HAYES
PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAlHP'l'ON
& WATKISS
600 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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